Tag Archives: government

Comment: Sariyev puts himself forward for presidency, says Kilner

FEB. 4 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — Temir Sariyev, until April 2016 Kyrgyzstan’s PM, put himself forward to run in a presidential election set for later this year, the first salvo in what could be a genuinely competitive vote to replace the incumbent Almazbek Atambayev.

The 53-year-old Sariyev had made it known since his resignation as PM over alleged links to corruption allegations that he still harboured ambitions to hold high office, and his candidacy for the top job via his Ak-Shumkar party, will not surprise observers. If anything, Mr Sariyev is considered an insider and could be a natural heir apparent for Atambayev who, as laid out by the constitution, is leaving the presidency after his single term in power.

He has not yet named a preferred successor although some analysts have said that this, in time, may end up being Sariyev.

Sariyev was Atambayev’s economy minister for four years before becoming PM in May 2015, the fifth PM since a revolution in 2010. At the time of his appointment analysts thought that with Sariyev, the government finally had a figurehead who had the political nous, backing and resilience to survive the country’s notoriously cut-throat politics. This was not to be the case, though, and he was forced to resign only 11 months later over his alleged links to a corrupt road building scheme.

A staunch proponent of close links with the Kremlin, Sariyev was the PM who, with Atambayev as president, took Kyrgyzstan into the Eurasian Economic Union, which also includes Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyzstan was the last to join in August 2015 and has always been its most reluctant member, with many businessmen and MPs blaming it for hindering Kyrgyzstan’s economy. Sariyev, though, has always backed its membership, a controversial stance in Kyrgyz politics.

But then Sariyev has always appeared to court controversy.

He is remembered in Kyrgyzstan for playing a key role in urging people to storm the security services headquarters in Bishkek in 2010 at the start of a revolution that would overthrow president Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

The question for Sariyev now is whether he can build his support — and he needs both support from inside the political system and support from the electorate — if he is going to win the election in November. His tenureship as PM was not an overly happy one and there were no anguished protests when he left office.

By James Kilner, Editor, The Conway Bulletin

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(News report from Issue No. 316, published on Feb. 10 2017)

Georgian parliament rejects presidential amendments

FEB. 9 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — Georgia’s parliament, dominated by the Dream Dream Coalition, voted overwhelmingly against amendments proposed by President Giorgi Margvelashvili to a bill which he said would impair the impartiality of judges. He had sent a bill drawn up by the Georgian Dream back for a second look. Georgian Dream have a so-called Constitutional Majority, controlling more than 3/4 of the seats in the 150-seat chamber.

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(News report from Issue No. 316, published on Feb. 10 2017)

Tsarukyan becomes chairman of Prosperous Armenia party

FEB. 10 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — At a congress in Yerevan, Gagik Tsarukyan one of the wealthiest Armenians, was officially sworn in as chairman of the Prosperous Armenia party. He had quit the party in 2015 after a row with Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan but said last month that he wanted to return for Armenia’s parliamentary elections in April. Analysts said that his return was designed to pull anti-government votes away from the real Armenian opposition parties.

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(News report from Issue No. 316, published on Feb. 10 2017)

Kazakh president sends Tasmagambetov to Moscow

FEB. 3 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — Until last Friday, Imangali Tasmagabtov had a sparkling CV. He was considered the consummate Kazakh insider and the man with a hotline to the president. If Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakh president since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, wanted something done, he turned to Tasmagabetov, his trusted lieutenant.

The urbane Tasmagambetov had been the Kazakh PM between 2002 and 2003; mayor of Almaty between 2004 and 2008; mayor of Astana between 2008 and 2014; defence minister from 2014 until 2016 and then a deputy PM until Feb. 3 2017. In each one of these sensitive positions, Nazarbayev personally appointed Tasmagambetov.

In Kazakhstan’s myopic politics, Tasmagambetov had even been talked of as a president-in-waiting and, if he had been given the top job, this would have come as no major surprise as his career has closely tracked that of Nazarbayev.

Now, followers of Kazakhstan’s politics will have to think again. Tasmagambetov will not be the next Kazakh president. That was made clear on Friday.

Instead, he will move to Moscow as the Kazakh ambassador to Russia, a diplomatic exile that will undermine his powerbase and take him away from the cauldron of Kazakhstan’s Astana-based politics.

It is amanoeuvre that has served Nazarbayev well. He has dispatched other powerful figures to embassies where they have been forced to watch the main action from the sidelines.

Perhaps Tasmagambetov’s error was to become too powerful and too popular. The 60-year-old had a high profile, bigger

than almost all other Kazakh politicians because of his tenureship of both the Almaty and Astana mayoral positions. He was also considered by ordinary people in Kazakhstan to be one of the most “Kazakh” of the elite, a major advantage in a country grappling with its newfound nationalism. He was popular and considered a man who got stuff done.

Kazakh politics will move on without Tasmagambetov. For now. But he is an ambitious man, born into a humble household in western Kazakhstan who still retains a sizable support-base. Don’t write off a comeback for the new Kazakh ambassador to Moscow.

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(News report from Issue No. 315, published on Feb. 3 2017)

Kazakh president demotes former ally

FEB. 3 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — >> How significant is Imangali Tasmagambetov’s shift from central government to Moscow as ambassador?

>> Very. He was considered one of just a handful of people who could take over from Nursultan Nazarbayev as president. This is a major demotion and has come as a surprise. Like a chess player, Nazarbayev is clearly manoeuvring his pieces so that he can execute a well-managed and orderly transfer of power. Last month he said that he wanted to give parliament more power. It was dressed up as a move to increase democracy, although most analysts think that this is a red herring and that the real motivator is transition.

>> So who will really benefit from Tasmagambetov’s move to Moscow?

>> That’s not exactly clear, although Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga, is being teed up nicely for a major role in government. She has taken on a bigger public role and since September 2016 has been a Senator and the chair of the Senate’s Affairs, Defence, and Security Committee. It’s our view that this is a way to prepare and groom Dariga for the top job. Essentially, by packing Tasmagambetov off to Moscow, Nazarbayev has dispatched one of her rivals.

>> I see. But are you sure that being the Kazakh ambassador in Moscow is a major demotion?

>> Yes. All the major policy-making goes on in Astana. Tasmagambetov is now marooned in Moscow away from the centre of power in Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev also has form for sending high-ranking men, who have their own powerbase that may threaten his plans, into exile. In 2014, he sent Aslan Musin to Zagreb to be the Kazakh ambassador there. Musin had previously been head of the Presidential Administration between 2008 and 2012 and had a strong powerbase in the west of the country, where he was from.

>> Got it. Why would Tasmagambetov appear to have threatened Nazarbayev?

>> We don’t know the specifics but Tasmagambetov is popular with ordinary people. He is seen as being more “Kazakh” than many of the other elite insiders. He also has a high profile. This is partly because he was a popular mayor of Almaty and Astana. His son-in-law is Kenes Rakishev who has been used heavily by the Kazakh elite as the frontman for buying up various companies. His latest acquisition was a majority stake in Kazakhstan’s biggest bank, Kazkommertsbank.

>> But now he is going to disappear from public view. Is that right?

>> Pretty much. People just wont see or hear of him in his new job. He’ll also be away from the political action in Astana which is important.

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(News report from Issue No. 315, published on Feb. 3 2017)

Kazakh President fires vice-PM Tasmagambetov

ALMATY, FEB. 3 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — In a surprise move, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev sacked his longtime ally Imangali Tasmagambetov as deputy PM and sent him to Moscow to be Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Russia.

The shift from central government to the diplomatic corps is a humiliating end to Mr Tamagambetov’s political career.

He had been a PM, mayor of both Almaty and Astana and also been the minister of defence. The 60-year-old Tasmagambetov is popular with ordinary Kazakhs and had been touted by analysts as a potential successor to Mr Nazarbayev as president.

Mr Nazarbayev gave no reason for Mr Tasmagambetov’s demotion.

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(News report from Issue No. 315, published on Feb. 3 2017)

Georgian president blocks parliamentary bill

JAN. 24 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — Georgian president Giorgi Margvelashvili vetoed a bill passed through parliament, which is dominated by the Georgian Dream coalition that he represents, that he said would damage the independence of the courts. The proposed bill had focused on changing the process through which court judges are appointed. Mr Margvelashvili and the Georgian Dream have increasingly rowed over governance issues.

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(News report from Issue No. 314, published on Jan. 27 2017)f

Comment: Nazarbayev announces constitutional changes, writes Hagelund

JAN. 27 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — In an unusual step, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev took to the airwaves to announce constitutional changes, suggesting the septuagenarian has fired the starting gun for his succession. Proposed amendments to Kazakhstan’s constitution were received with scepticism by the Kazakh people; yet they include changes that will prove significant.

Planned limits on presidential power have little immediate impact as Nazarbayev’s personal, informal influence determines the rules of the game. However, in the post-Nazarbayev era, formal institutions are likely to play an increasingly influential role.

Nazarbayev is setting the scene for his successor to be less powerful. This likely reflects recognition on his part that no individual has the authority or legitimacy to succeed him as a strongman (or –woman) ruler. While the proposed strengthening of parliament will not result in a multi-party democracy, a form of pluralism already exists with elite factions supporting differing policies.

Verisk Maplecroft considers intra-elite differences the only plausible source of a more competitive political environment in the immediate post- Nazarbayev era, but they equally raise the potential for instability. Elite factionalism is currently mediated by the president, but with a less powerful successor facing a potentially more vocal and influential government and parliament, the scene is set for more overt elite clashes.

In the absence of strong state institutions, clashes over policy – or of personalities – risk undermining government stability. A particular cause for concern is therefore Kazakhstan’s weak rule of law, specifically the little emphasis Nazarbayev put on the importance of the judiciary in refereeing the balance of power between different branches of government.

A more complex collective system of government would be a step-change in the political landscape for businesses after a quarter of a century of

relative stability. Collective government implies less clarity around who the power brokers are, particularly as the system is established and elite jostle for power.

When the time comes, navigating Kazakh politics will, in all probability, prove challenging. Policy and political volatility is bound to increase without a single power broker to mediate between different factions of the ruling elite.

By Camilla Hagelund, senior Europe analyst at risk consultancy Verisk Maplecroft

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(News report from Issue No. 314, published on Jan. 27 2017)

Kyrgyzstan increases fines for swearing in public and drinking

JAN. 24 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev signed into law a decree that increased fines handed out to people who swear on the street and drink in office blocks, media reported.Police officers can now hand out fines of 15,000 som ($200) for swearing in public and 10,000 som for drinking in the workplace.

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(News report from Issue No. 314, published on Jan. 27 2017)

Kazakh President promises to empower Kazakh parliament

ALMATY, JAN. 25 2017 (The Conway Bulletin) — In a televised address to the nation lasting 9-1/2 minutes, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev described how he wanted to bring in a series of reforms that would shift power from the president to parliament.

The main proposals focused on how the government was formed. Currently,Mr Nazarbayev appoints all the key positions in government and the state’s main agencies. This was a task that he said he wanted to hand over to the PM. He also said that he wanted parliament to have more say over social and economic issues.

“The point of the proposed reform isina serious redistribution of powers and democratisation of the political system as a whole,” he said during this address in both Kazakh and Russian with his trademark formal and deadpan delivery.

The speech, though, was short on detail and lacked a timeframe for the proposed changes. Although the aim of the speech appears to be to burnish Mr Nazarbayev’s credentials as a democrat and to ease concerns that he doesn’t have a succession plan, the main reaction was derision.

In Almaty, Mikhail, 29, said: “This is another imitation and an attempt to shift the responsibility for worsening living conditions.”

And analysts said Mr Nazarbayev appeared eager to disengage from difficult social and employment policies but retain control of duties linked to foreign policy and security. “It’s almost like he wants to pass off responsibility for the really hard stuff,” said Bruce Pannier, a Central Asia analyst at RFE/RL.

Not everybody was downbeat.

“That sounds great, nonetheless these reforms require strengthening of mass media and freedom of speech,” said Galym, 26.

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(News report from Issue No. 314, published on Jan. 27 2017)